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The approach taken in this essay to the moral issues involved in
abortion starts from the proposition that a particularly frustrating
impasse has been reached both in scholarly discussion and in public
debate about abortion. If we strip the professional and academic discussion of its scholarly and scientific niceties, and dampen the heat
and passion of debate in the political and legal arenas, we find that
each side, whatever its pro- or anti-rhetorical label, holds a fundamental conviction which to those on the opposing side seems implausible. These convictions generally cluster the ide,as of "rights," "person," and "choice." For instance, a fundamental conviction at the
basis of a "pro-life " position is the fetus' early and definitive entitlement to the rights of a person, while a fundamental conviction of a
"pro-choice" position is the pregnant woman's definitive entitlement
to the unimpeded determination of the course of her future. Although
those who hold these convictions adduce arguments in their support,
to those on the opposing side of the issue the arguments rarely, if ever,
seem adequate to carry the weight of the conviction. To those on the
opposing side, it often seems that the conviction would be held even if
there were no argument to support it.
Continued public discussion since the Supreme Court's abortion
decisions has done little to overcome this impasse. Perhaps it is not yet
time to abandon hope that further discussion of "rights," "persons,"
and "choice" could effect a consensus adequate for guiding at least
some public policy decisions and even some personal moral decisions.
While such discussion continues, however, the situation of impasse
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makes it advisable to explore other perspectives on the moral issues
involved in abortion in the hope that they might help us see our way
through the impasse.
I am therefore proposing a perspective for analyzing the moral
dimensions of abortion which does not focus upon questions of
"rights," important as these questions are. The focus of this perspective, instead, is on the question of what is truly good for human
persons. From the standpoint of the history of philosophy, this perspective is by no means a "new" one; some of its most important
features can be found in the ancient philosophers Plato and Aristotle.
It is, however, a perspective which generally has not been put to use in
the Gontemporary discussion of abortion. 1 This perspective tries to
win some clarity for our thinking about the nature of what is good for
human persons and about the conduct which effectively serves that
good. It does so by specifically taking account of the moral significance of the kinds of human good which have become ingredient in a
situation as a result of the human conduct, practices and institutions
which have brought it about. An account of the moral significance of
these kinds of human good is of particular importance for discussion
of abortion because judgments made about the morality of abortion
- be they in general or in regard to particular cases - frequently
presuppose judgments about the kinds of human good which are, or
ought to be, served by some of the basic practices and institutions of
our lives together in society. A perspective which brings to light these
judgments about human good has the advantage of making plain to us
more of what is morally at stake in such situations than can be seen
from a perspective fashioned solely in terms of concepts such as
"rights," "choice," and "persons."
An elaboration of this perspective will show how it brings these
judgments to light and enables us to consider their significance for the
moral assessment we can make about abortion. This perspective provides a framework of concepts which enable us to understand and to
delimit in moral terms the situation (or the types of situations) in
which abortion might be considered as a possible course of action,
either in an individual case, or as a practice to be discouraged, permitted, or encouraged by public policy. In particular it views such
situations arising at a point at which a set of important human institutions, practices, and patterns of conduct that ought to serve human
good intersect with a set of actions and decisions by particular human
beings which have resulted in pregnancy. Some of the institutions,
practices, and patterns of conduct which intersect with the particular
actions and decisions are patterns of sexual conduct both within and
outside the structure of married life and the family; patterns and
practices of marriage and family life; patterns of economic opportunity and the distribution of wealth, resources, and income; patterns of
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statutory law, judicial interpretation, and executive enforcement
which delimit the parameters of the legal exercise of rights; practices
of medicine which delimit the parameters of physical and mental
health.
To delimit the situation adequately in moral terms we must be able
to identify and assess the moral significance of the elements of each
intersecting set. From this, we can then go on to make a sound moral
judgment about possible responses to the situation , including that of
abortion. When discussion of the morality of abortion employs, as its
basic perspective, the concepts of " rights," "choice," and " persons"
(where "person" primarily signifies " entitlement to rights " ), it views
the situation along only one of its intersecting lines, i.e., the one
framed by the set of actions and decisions made by particular persons
insofar as they are bearers of rights and capable of choice. From this
perspective, the institutions, practices, and patterns of conduct which
enter into the fashioning of the situation, and the human "good"
which they are to serve, are viewed obliquely: their moral significance
is assessed and assessable only in terms of their bearing upon the rights
and choices of the persons involved. 2 The perspective I am proposing
enables us to take sight upon the situation also along lines provided by
the other set of intersecting elements, i.e ., along lines provided by
human institutions and practices, and the good they serve. Such
"sighting" asks of each of the elements of this set: What kind of
human good does it serve and how does that good bear upon the
situation?

Failure to Raise Question
Failure to raise this kind of question manifests itself in a sadly
ironic way in many discussions of abortion. In this discussion, considerations of " good" - especially of the human good which ought to
be served by the human institutions and practices ingredient in the
situation - are often presupposed and left unexamined in the very
description offered of the situation. Such a situation is most frequently described as an "unwanted pregnancy"; packed into that
description - and the judgment consequent upon it, that abortion is a
possible response to the situation - are assessments about the kind of
human good which ought to be served by the institutions, practices
and patterns of conduct already ingredient in the situation.
Let me illustrate: the reasons which can be offered for a particular
pregnancy or type of pregnancy being " unwanted" are numerous and
varied; they range from a judgment of immediate danger to a woman 's
life , through considerations for the well-being or the economic prosMay , 1979
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pects of the family, to the inconvenience of interrupting a career or
disrupting a personal relationship. Whatever the particular reasons or
types of reasons may be, most, if not all of them presuppose some
judgment about the kind of human good which ought to be served by
the institutions and practices ingredient in the situation. For instance,
patterns of economic opportunity or of economic expectations presumed to be worth pursuing can make particular pregnancies
"unwanted." The "good" of marriage and family life is understood
variously in our culture: it can be understood to serve as an ideal of
self-fulfillment; it can be understood as a partnership to serve career
ambitions or social expectations; it can be understood to be a partnership fostering a mutual concern for others extending beyond the
couple's relation. The judgment that a pregnancy is "unwanted" in particular cases is one that frequently seems to be made in conjunction
with which good one assumes marriage to serve. It is obviously a judgment which is more likely to be made when one takes that good to be
simply self-fulfillment than when one takes that good to be a partnership fostering a mutual concern for others extending beyond the
couple's relation. Patterns of sexual conduct, whether within or outside of marriage, are often determined in our culture by critically
unexamined presuppositions about how that conduct serves the
psychological "good" or "health" or "integration" of human persons,
or the "good" of a particular relation between persons. 3 These patterns, and the assumptions about "good" on which they are based,
frequently function as a basis on which a pregnancy is judged "unwanted." Patterns of medical treatment and of the availability and
distribution of health care can playa role determining what we consider to be acceptable standards of physical and mental health. While
functioning in the determination of whether a fetus is "normal," such
standards can also more subtly function to determine the acceptability
of particular forms of "abnormality" on emotional, financial, or
social, as well as on medical, grounds.4 As a result, these patterns and
practices, and the assumptions about the characteristic good of mental
and physical health which they support, can also play a role in forming a judgment whether a pregnancy is "wanted" or "unwanted."
These illustra~ions should make clear that a description of a pregnancy as "unwanted" typically carries with it jUdgments, made implicitly and uncritically about the kinds of human good that are at stake
in the situation and which ought to be served by a response to that
situation. These implicit judgments about human good are then 'further obscured by using "rights" and "choice" as the focus of discussion. As a result, discussion of abortion conducted just from the vantage point provided by these concepts is unable to make a full critical
examination of the significance of these implicit judgments about
good for bur moral assessment of abortion.
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Point Put in General Form
This point can be put in a general form. Description of a pregnancy
as "unwanted" presupposes a certain way of understanding human
good: what is "good" is fashioned in terms of what we "want." This
understanding predisposes us to see only certain moral possibilities for
action when faced with a situation which has, or is likely to result in,
an outcome which we do not want: the set of actions which can
prevent, terminate, or mitigate the unwanted outcome. Analysis of the
moral dimensions of such a situation from a perspective of "rights"
and "choice" then reinforces this understanding of human good as a
function of our wants, i.e., "rights" entitle us to take steps needed to
pursue or obtain what we want; our wants and our choices in accord
with such wants can be subject to constraint only when they come into
conflict with the "rights" of others. Nothing fundamental to this concept of " rights" or of "choice," however, requires us to doubt that
"good " is to be fash ioned in t erms of our wants , nor does constraint
placed upon the pursuit of our wants in virtue of the rights of others
require us to question whether what we want, or whether our wants
themselves, are good. As a result, moral analysis conducted in terms of
these co ncepts tends also to see the moral possibilities for action in
such a situation to be constituted just to be actions which would
prevent, eliminate, or mitigate the unwanted outcome.

•

A significantly different understanding of human good and its relation to wants, and a more inclusive and challenging set of possibilities
for moral action can be formed from the perspective proposed in this
essay. This perspective requires us to consider the possibility that we
can fashion what we want in terms of what is good ; it opens up for us
the possibility of taking actions that make us realign or even change
our wants. In its analysis of a situation of "unwanted" pregnancy it
requires us to consider, as possible and morally appropriate responses,
actions which would make the pregnancy wanted rather than eliminate it because it is unwanted .
The introduction into public discussion of the perspective I have
sketched out will not be an easy undertaking. I will conclude this
essay by suggesting two ways in which such an introduction could be
made . These two ways require a more careful and detailed articulation
than can be given here; I offer them now in outline in the hope of
provoking more extended discussion which would provide the needed
articulation .
The first way would be to propose to the various parties in public
and scholarly discussion that there is a need for them to offer a
critically justified account of what constitutes human good in general,
and of the various kinds of particular human good, in virtue of which
judgments are made about whether a pregnancy is "wanted" or
"unwanted." These accounts should also be shown to require considMay, 1979
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eration of the social character of the good served by the human practices and institutions ingredient in the situation. 5 Two areas of h uman
conduct in which such accounts of "good" are especiall y needed for
the discussion of abortion are in regard to the institutions and prac tices of marriage and family life and in regard to the patterns and
practices of sexual conduct. In particular need of critical eluc idation is
the social character of the good served by marriage and family life and
the consequences which this has for the way we are to understand the
good to be served by human sexual conduct.

Resources in Theological/Philosophical Underpinnings
There are, I believe, resources within both the philosophical and the
theological underpinnings of a position which judges a fetus to be
human life from the beginning which can be developed to say true and
significant things about the social context in which such life is to be
introduced and fostered. Some of the things such a position could say
are clearly " countercultural" in a society which has increasingly fostered, by its practices, an understanding of the "good" of marriage
and family life in terms of its service of personal self-fulfi ll ment and
economic well-being, and an understanding of the "good" of sexual
conduct in terms of its service of an ideal of psychological " integration" and "adjustment." It is quite obvious that as such an understanding of the good of these institutions and practices becomes ever
more deeply embedded in our culture , the less likely abortion wi ll be
seen to be even morally problematic; it is even less likely that grounds
will be found for a general agreement on public policy discouraging
abortion and offering effective support for alternatives.
Development of the kind of account I am suggesting could, on the
other hand, allow persons whose convictions are "pro-life" to spell out
more clearly the elements of human good , both personal and social,
served by marriage, family life , and sexual conduct, which lie at the
basis of their conviction. Such an account wou ld introduce into public
and academic discussion a pointed and thoroughgoing critique of -the
underlying presuppositions about the human good served by these
practices which form the basis for the cultural and societal conditions
that have tended to make abortion morally unproblematic in late 20th
century America; insofar as those same presuppositions are often operative in the articulation of "pro-choice " positions , such a critique
would require those positions to set forth for critical dIscussion their
understanding of the human good which is to be served by those
institutions and practices.
A second way for introducing this perspective in the discussion of
abortion would be through the formulation of the kinds of questions
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which point out the inadequacies of a moral analysis conducted solely
from a perspective of "rights." Such questions would help show the
rather ironic fact that, for all the rhetoric which connects "rights" to
"persons" and the respect due them, this perspective for moral analysis most frequently functions in terms of a highly abstract understanding of human persons: the exercise of rights is given value in
abstraction from the history, the future, and the concrete set of social
relations in which the person exercising the right stands. Human good
is focused down to the good of the exercise of rights. As a result of
this abstract understanding of the human person, one rarely finds
posed the questions of what human good is served by the exercise of
particular rights, or of how the exercise of this (or any other) "right"
fosters the establishment of the dispositions and traits requisite for
becoming a good person.
Once such questions are raised, it would then enable us to form our
moral judgments on the basis of the set of moral concepts which allow
us to specify the kinds of concrete human good served by the exercise
of rights: these are the concepts of "character," "virtue," and "moral
skills." 6 These concepts enable us to bring to bear upon the concrete
decisions and actions of individuals the perspective we gain by sighting
along the idea of good. They are concepts which enable us to anchor
the exercise of particular human rights to considerations of human
good and to the concrete history, future, and social relations of the
persons in the situation.

,

Let me offer in conclusion an illustration of how one of these
concepts, "moral skill," can be of use in sorting out the moral significance of one kind of situation to which abortion, or the exercise of a
" right" to abortion, has been proposed as a desirable solution. The rise
in the incidence of pregnancy among young teenagers has recently
gained attention in public discussion . Inevitably, discussion focused
upon "rights," e.g., in the light of Supreme Court decisions, is a young
woman to be granted the "right" to seek an abortion without her
parents' consent? That issue, in turn, generates more discussion
focused on "rights," be it about parental rights, rights of access to
birth control information, or rights of confidentiality in a physicianpatient or counselor-client relation. Such discussion from the perspective of "rights" does not require (nor frequently even allow) us to
examine whether misperceptions of human good, or whether failures
in the effective fashioning of what is authentically good for the persons involved, have brought the situation about ; neither does it require
us to raise the question of how a morally appropriate response should
address itself to remedy the moral misperceptions or moral ineffectiveness which have brought the situation about.
On the other hand, analysis from a perspective of human good,
brought to focus upon the fostering and exercise of moral skills,
May, 1979
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would enable us first, to locate those failures in moral perception
which contribute to the phenomenon of increased teenage pregnancy,
and then to determine their significance for the judgment we can
make about appropriate moral responses. We can locate one major
type of moral misperception of what is good for human persons and
subsequent failure to exercise the moral skills required for fostering
such good in the attitudes and patterns of conduct which commonly
and unrefiectively define parent-to-child, person-to-person, and person-to-institution relations in our culture. Instances of such misperceptions can be found in attitudes and patterns of conduct which conceive of the parent as "pal," or in which rivalry is unconsciously
fostered by parents making their children the focus of their own
unfulfilled life expectations; these all seem to view awry the human
good which parent-child relations should serve. As a result, they prevent the fostering of the moral skills of mutual trust and respect
requisite for adequate moral perception and conduct both in the relation itself and in other activities significantly touched by it. Another
form of misperception is one that tolerates or encourages patterns of
social relations, among young persons and adults alike, which places a
premium on sexual attractiveness, makes it definitory of the worth of
the relation, and makes the test of such relations the adequacy of
sexual promise or performance; another misperception of the authentic good for human persons which can be located from this perspective
is the perpetuation of economic and social practices which create for
certain groups in our society conditions of such unrelieved desperation
for which escape can be found only in pitiful and often tragic selfassertions of violence and promiscuity.
The list of items which could be picked out as elem ents ind icative
of massive moral failure at the roots of this phenom enon of increased
teenage pregnancy is depressingly long and cuts across social and economic distinctions. Each item of failure points to the fact that in our
culture's frenetic pursuit of the goods of econom ic well-being and
psychic self-satisfaction, we have paid no attention to, and allowed to
wither the institutions, practices and customs that signify a commitment to basic trust in one another and which enable us to develop and
exercise the skills to care for one another 's total well being: marriage
as a school for self-giving and fidelity; the family as the locus for a life
infused by trust and mutual respect; and the civic and religious community as the realm in which our hopes and aspirations for eac h other
are given stable form and entrusted to the future.
To situations which result from these forms of moral blindness and
the failure to develop the effective moral skills of trust and care, a
moral perspective formed by a consideration of "rights " and "choice"
can only offer a co unsel of despair: It allows and encourages us to let
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others - particularly the most helpless others - bear the burden of
our failures. We must be able to do better than this; it is my hope that
the development of a perspective focused on the concepts of human
good, and moral skills will enable us to do better. 7
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